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Capital-account liberalization was once seen
as an inevitable step along the path to eco-
nomic development for poor countries. Liberal-
izing the capital account, it was said, would
permit financial resources to flow from capital-
abundant countries, where expected returns
were low, to capital-scarce countries, where ex-
pected returns were high. The flow of resources
into the liberalizing countries would reduce
their cost of capital, increase investment, and
raise output (Stanley Fischer, 1998; Lawrence
H. Summers, 2000). The principal policy ques-
tion was not whether to liberalize the capital
account, but when—before or after undertaking
macroeconomic reforms such as inflation stabi-
lization and trade liberalization (Ronald I.
McKinnon, 1991). Or so the story went.
In recent years, intellectual opinion has
moved against liberalization. Financial crises in
Asia, Russia, and Latin America have shifted
the focus of the conversation from when coun-
tries should liberalize to if they should do so at
all. Opponents of the process argue that capital-
account liberalization does not generate greater
efficiency. Instead, liberalization invites specu-
lative hot money flows and increases the likeli-
hood of financial crises with no discernible
positive effects on investment, output, or any
other real variable with nontrivial welfare im-
plications (Jagdish Bhagwhati, 1998; Dani
Rodrik, 1998; Joseph Stiglitz, 2002).
While opinions about capital-account liberal-
ization are abundant, facts are relatively scarce.
This paper tries to increase the ratio of facts to
opinions. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s a
number of developing countries liberalized their
stock markets, opening them to foreign inves-
tors for the first time. These liberalizations
constitute discrete changes in the degree of
capital-account openness, which allow for a
positive empirical description of the cost of
capital, investment, and growth during liberal-
ization episodes.
Figure 1 previews the central message that
the rest of this paper develops in more detail.
The cost of capital falls when developing coun-
tries liberalize the stock market. Since the cost
of capital falls, investment should also increase,
as profit-maximizing firms drive down the mar-
ginal product of capital to its new lower cost.
Figure 2 is consistent with this prediction. Lib-
eralization leads to a sharp increase in the
growth rate of the capital stock. Finally, as a
direct consequence of growth accounting, the
increase in investment should generate a tem-
porary increase in the growth rate of output per
worker. Figure 3 confirms that the growth rate
of output per worker rises in the aftermath of
liberalization.
While the figures do no harm to the efficiency
view of capital-account liberalization, a number
of caveats are in order. For example, it is legit-
imate to interpret a fall in the dividend yield
(Fig. 1) as a decline in the cost of capital, if
there is no change in the expected future growth
rate of dividends at the time of liberalization.
But stock-market liberalizations are usually ac-
companied by other economic reforms that may
increase the expected future growth rate of out-
put and dividends (Henry, 2000a, b). Because
liberalizations do not occur in isolation, it is
important to think carefully about how to inter-
pret the data. Neoclassical theory provides a
good starting point for framing the issues.
I. Theory
There are two components to a country’s
cost of capital: the risk-free rate and the equity
premium. Theory suggests that both will fall
when a poor country liberalizes. The following
partial-equilibrium, mean variance arguments
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based on Rene´ M. Stulz (1999) make the central
points most succinctly.
Assume a small country whose equity market
is completely segmented from world equity
markets. Also assume that all investors in the
world have the same constant relative risk aver-
sion and care only about the expected return and
variance of their investment. Let E[R˜ M] denote
the equilibrium required rate of return on the
aggregate domestic stock market before liberal-
ization and let rf denote the domestic risk-free
interest rate. Define the price of risk as follows:
the aggregate risk premium, E[R˜ M]  rf, di-
vided by the variance of the aggregate return on
the market, Var(R˜ M). Under our assumptions,
the price of risk in the small country before
liberalization is a constant, T. It follows that
(1) ER˜ M  rf T VarR˜ M.
Now consider what happens to the required
rate of return when the country opens its stock
market to the rest of the world and also allows
its residents to invest abroad. Assume that the
mean and variance of domestic dividends are
unaltered by the liberalization. Let E[R˜ *M] de-
note the required rate of return on the market
after liberalization, and let E[R˜ W] be the re-
quired rate of return on the world equity market.
With completely open capital markets, the
world risk-free rate, r*f, becomes the relevant
interest rate. The risk premium on the domestic
stock market will now depend on the following
two factors: (i) the beta of the domestic stock
market with the world stock market, MW, and
(ii) the world risk premium, E[R˜ W]  r*f. Fol-
lowing liberalization it must be the case that
(2) ER˜ *M  r*f MWER˜ W  r*f .
Since the liberalizing country is small, adding
its stock market to the world market portfolio
has a negligible effect on the variance (and
hence the risk premium) of the world market
portfolio. It follows that (E[R˜ W]  r*f )  T
Var(R˜ W). Using this fact, the definition of MW,
and a little bit of algebra, one can show that
after liberalization the required rate of return on
the domestic stock market is given by
(3) ER˜ *M  r*f T CovR˜ M, R˜ W.
Subtracting equation (1) from equation (3)
gives the difference in the post- and pre-
liberalization required rates of return:
(4) E R˜ M  r*f rf
 T CovR˜ M, R˜ W  VarR˜ M.
Since poor countries have lower capital-to-labor
ratios than rich countries, one would expect that
FIGURE 1. THE COST OF CAPITAL FALLS WHEN COUNTRIES
LIBERALIZE THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT
FIGURE 2. INVESTMENT BOOMS WHEN COUNTRIES
LIBERALIZE THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT
FIGURE 3. THE GROWTH RATE OF OUTPUT PER WORKER
INCREASES WHEN COUNTRIES LIBERALIZE
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rf  r*f. Hence, the first term on the right-hand
side of (4) is negative. Next, consider the
change in the equity premium. For every coun-
try in the sample, Cov(R˜ M, R˜ W), the covariance
of the local market with the world market, is
less than Var(R˜ M), the variance of the local
market (Stulz, 1999). Hence, the second term is
also negative. The central result follows: Liber-
alization reduces the cost of capital.
II. Evidence
Identifying liberalization dates is the first step
in examining the evidence. In principle, identi-
fying liberalization dates simply involves find-
ing the date on which the government declares
that foreigners may purchase domestic shares.
In practice, the liberalization process is not so
transparent. In many cases, there is no obvious
government policy decree to which one can
point. When there is no salient liberalization
decree, I infer the date on which foreigners
could first hold domestic shares by determining
the first date on which a closed-end country
fund was established. Figures 1–3 are based on
liberalization dates from 18 countries: Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia,
Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pa-
kistan, The Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Tur-
key, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
Stock-market liberalizations may seem like a
narrow way to define capital-account liberaliza-
tion relative to the broader liberalization indi-
cators that are employed elsewhere in the
literature (Hali Edison et al., 2002). But it is
precisely the narrowness of stock-market liber-
alizations that make them more useful for the
purpose at hand. Studies that use broad liberal-
ization indicators focus on cross-sectional data,
examining the long-run correlation between av-
erage openness and average investment. Exam-
ining the correlation between average openness
and investment indicates whether investment
rates are permanently higher in countries with
capital accounts that are more open. The prob-
lem with this approach is that neoclassical the-
ory makes no such prediction.
What the theory does predict is that capital-
poor countries will experience a temporary in-
crease in investment when they liberalize.
Hence, the relevant issue is not whether coun-
tries with open capital accounts have higher
investment rates, but whether investment in-
creases in the immediate aftermath of liberal-
izations. The most transparent way of testing
the prediction is to compare investment rates
during liberalization episodes with investment
rates during non-liberalization periods. Because
they constitute a radical shift in the degree of
capital-account openness, stock-market liberal-
izations provide ideal natural experiments for
confronting the theory with data.
A. Cost of Capital
Having identified dates on which liberaliza-
tions occur, the key question is how to detect
empirically whether the cost of capital falls. The
cost of capital is the equilibrium-required rate of
return on the stock market. Therefore, if liber-
alization reduces the cost of capital, one should
see a one-time revaluation of stock prices when
liberalizations occur. For the descriptive exer-
cise here, it is more convenient to use annual
dividend yields.
Again, Figure 1 is consistent with the view
that liberalization reduces the cost of capital.
The figure plots the average aggregate dividend
yield across the 18 liberalizing countries in
event time (year [0] is the year of liberaliza-
tion). The average dividend yield falls by
roughly 240 basis points—from an average
level of 5.0 percent in the five years prior to
liberalization to an average of 2.6 percent in the
five years following liberalization.
Figure 1 is, of course, also consistent with
other interpretations. Recall that the dividend
yield equals the required rate of return on equity
minus the expected growth rate of dividends:
(5) D/P  ER˜ M  g.
Section I explains why liberalization reduces
E[R˜ M]. Here, the variable under scrutiny is g,
the expected growth rate of dividends. If g does
not change when liberalizations occur, then a
fall in the dividend yield implies a fall in the
cost of capital. Because liberalizations are
part of a general process that involves substan-
tial macroeconomic reforms, however, there is
a strong possibility that they are associated
with changes in g. Economic reforms do have
significant effects on the stock market (Henry,
2002); but the financial effects of liberalization
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remain statistically and economically signifi-
cant, after controlling for contemporaneous
reforms (Henry, 2000a, Geert Bekaert and
Campbell Harvey, 2000).
B. Investment
If liberalizations reduce the cost of capital
then one should also see more investment. Fig-
ure 2 shows that the growth rate of the capital
stock rises by 1.1 percentage points in the af-
termath of liberalizations, from an average of
5.4 percent per year in the pre-liberalization
period to an average of 6.5 percent in the post-
liberalization period, but Figure 2 is subject to
the same criticism as Figure 1. Does invest-
ment increase because liberalization reduces the
cost of capital? Or, is the entire effect driven
by a reform-induced rise in g? Investment
does increase following major reforms, but the
effect of liberalization on investment remains
significant, after controlling for reforms (Henry,
2000b).
C. Growth
Since the growth rate of the capital stock
increases, the growth rate of output per worker
should also rise. Figure 3 confirms that the
growth rate of output per worker rises by 2.3
percentage points—from an average of 1.4 per-
cent per year in the pre-liberalization period to
an average of 3.7 percent per year in the post-
liberalization period. On the one hand, there is
nothing surprising about Figure 3. Whereas Fig-
ures 1 and 2 document behavioral responses of
prices and quantities of capital to liberalization,
Figure 3 simply provides a mechanical check of
the standard growth accounting equation:
(6) Yˆ  Aˆ  Kˆ  1  Lˆ
where a “hat” over a variable denotes the
change in the natural log of that variable.
The interesting point about Figure 3 is that
the increase in the growth rate of output per
worker is too large to be explained by the in-
crease in investment. A few simple calculations
illustrate the point. The elasticity of output with
respect to capital, , is typically around 0.33.
Therefore, based on Figure 2, one would expect
the growth rate of output per worker in the
post-liberalization period to be about 0.363
(0.33 	 1.1) percentage points higher. But Fig-
ure 3 displays a 2.3-percentage-point increase in
the growth rate of output per worker. All else
equal, a 1.1-percentage-point increase in the
growth rate of the capital stock can produce a
2.3-percentage-point increase in the growth rate
of output per worker only if the elasticity of
output with respect to capital is on the order
of 2!
Bekaert et al. (2001) find that the increase in
growth due to liberalization is slightly larger
than 1 percentage point after controlling for a
number of variables. Nevertheless, their finding
still requires an elasticity of output with respect
to capital that is greater than 1. Their paper does
not address the inconsistency of their finding
with standard production theory. I do so here.
The missing piece is, of course, total factor
productivity (TFP) growth. Equation (6) shows
that any increase in the rate of growth of output
that is not accounted for by an increase in the
growth rate of capital and labor must be the
result of an increase in Aˆ , the growth rate of
technology. In the current context, it is impor-
tant to remember that the pure theory of capital-
account liberalization focuses exclusively on
capital accumulation. Technological change and
TFP growth do not enter into the story. There-
fore, one cannot automatically claim that liber-
alization is also responsible for the increase in
TFP growth.
Now, it is true that, if liberalization increases
the allocative efficiency of domestic invest-
ment, it will also raise TFP growth without any
need for technological change. However, it is
not obvious why capital-account liberalization,
a policy change directed at increasing interna-
tional allocative efficiency, would have any ef-
fect on domestic allocative efficiency (Anusha
Chari and Henry, 2002a; Pierre Olivier Gourin-
chas and Olivier Jeanne, 2002). But if theories
of capital-account liberalization cannot explain
the increase in TFP growth, what can?
III. Open Questions
The simplest answer is that the economic
reforms, which make it difficult to interpret the
fall in the dividend yield as a decrease in the
cost of capital, are also responsible for the in-
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crease in TFP growth. While Aˆ is typically
interpreted as the growth rate of technological
progress, any economic reform that raises the
efficiency of a given stock of capital and labor
will also increase Aˆ , even in the absence of
technological change.
The argument is not that theories based on
capital-account liberalization are utterly incapa-
ble of explaining increases in TFP growth. To
the contrary, one can tell augmented stories in
which capital-account liberalization does in-
duce technological change. For example, liber-
alization may ease binding capital constraints,
thereby enabling firms to adopt technologies
that they could not finance prior to the liberal-
ization. It is also possible that increased risk-
sharing encourages investment in riskier,
higher-growth technologies in the spirit of Mau-
rice Obstfeld (1994).
The point is that the developing countries in
this sample may have increased their rate of
adoption of new production technologies during
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s but, if that
is the case, it is not immediately apparent
from aggregate data (Figs. 1–3). In contrast,
aggregate data are completely consistent with
the preponderance of readily observable evi-
dence that the countries engaged in substantial
economic reform. Occam’s razor argues for
the simple, reform-driven explanation of TFP
growth over more elaborate capital-account-
liberalization-based stories.
Having said that, the only way to resolve the
issue completely is to confront it with data that
are capable of distinguishing between compet-
ing theories. Recent studies of liberalization that
move from aggregate to firm-level data show
the way forward. For example, Chari and Henry
(2002b) provide evidence that liberalization
does increase risk-sharing. Examining whether
the increase in risk-sharing induces firms to adopt
new production technologies would provide a
direct test of capital-account-liberalization-
based explanations of TFP growth.
IV. Conclusion
When developing countries liberalize the
stock market, their cost of capital falls, invest-
ment booms, and the growth rate of output per
worker increases. While the facts cast doubt on
the view that capital-account liberalization
brings no real benefits, there are many impor-
tant questions to which the evidence does not
speak. For some of these questions, such as
whether liberalizations cause crises, aggregate
data may yet prove useful. For other questions,
aggregate data are simply too coarse to provide
precise answers. Moving the technological fron-
tier to firm-level data should enhance general
understanding of the process by which the ef-
fects of liberalization are transmitted to the real
economy.
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